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Abstract. Loyalty programs are promoted by vendors to incentivize
loyalty in buyers. Although such programs have become widespread, they
have been criticized by business experts and consumer associations: loy-
alty results in profiling and hence in loss of privacy of consumers. We
propose a protocol for privacy-preserving loyalty programs that allows
vendors and consumers to enjoy the benefits of loyalty (returning cus-
tomers and discounts, respectively), while allowing consumers to stay
anonymous and empowering them to decide how much of their profile
they reveal to the vendor. The vendor must offer additional reward if
he wants to learn more details on the consumer’s profile. Our protocol
is based on partially blind signatures and generalization techniques, and
provides anonymity to consumers and their purchases, while still allow-
ing negotiated consumer profiling.
Keywords: Loyalty programs, customer privacy, anonymization, blind
signatures, e-cash.
1 Introduction
Loyalty programs are marketing efforts implemented by vendors, espe-
cially retailers, that are aimed at establishing a lasting relationship with
consumers. In a loyalty program, the vendor pursues two main goals: i) to
encourage the consumer to make more purchases in the future (returning
customer); ii) to allow the vendor to profile the consumer in view of con-
ducting market research and segmentation (profiled customer). In order
to lure consumers into a loyalty program, the vendor offers them rewards,
typically loyalty points that consumers can later exchange for discounts,
gifts or other benefits offered by the vendor. Normally, enrollment to
loyalty programs involves some kind of registration procedure, in which
customers fill out a form with their personal information and are granted
a loyalty card, be it a physical card (magnetic stripe or smartcard) or a
smartphone application.
Market analysis and client segmentation are carried out by build-
ing profiles of individual customers based on their personal informa-
tion, which customers supply to the vendor during enrollment to the
loyalty program, and their purchase records, collected every time cus-
tomers present their loyalty cards. The profiles thus assembled are used
in marketing actions, such as market studies and targeted advertising.
Although loyalty programs have become widespread, they are expe-
riencing a loss of active participants and they have been criticized by
business experts and consumer associations. Criticism is mainly due to
privacy issues, because it is not always clear whether the benefits vendors
offer in their loyalty programs are worth the loss of consumer privacy
caused by profiling [15,17,7,9].
Loyalty programs can offer clear advantages to both vendors and con-
sumers, like returning customers and special discounts, respectively. How-
ever, privacy concerns regarding buyer profiling affect more and more the
acceptance of such programs, as the public awareness on the dangers of
personal information disclosure is increasing.
1.1 Contribution and plan of this paper
In this work we propose a protocol for privacy-preserving loyalty pro-
grams that allows vendors and consumers to enjoy the benefits of loyalty,
while preserving the anonymity of consumers and empowering them to
decide how accurately they reveal their profile to the vendor. In order to
encourage customers not just to return but also to disclose more of their
profile, the vendor must offer additional rewards to consumers. Thus,
vendors pay consumers for their private information. On the other hand,
consumers become aware of how much their personal data are worth to
vendors, and they can decide to what extent they are ready to reveal such
data in exchange for what benefits.
To empower consumers as described above, we provide them with a
mechanism that allows them to profile themselves, generalize their profiles
and submit these generalized profiles to the vendor in an anonymous way.
There are some technical challenges to be overcome:
– The proposed mechanism should prevent vendors from linking the
generalized profiles to the identity of buyers, to particular transactions
or to particular loyalty points submitted for redemption.
– To prevent straightforward profiling by the vendor, payment should
be anonymous. In online stores, to completely achieve anonymity, the
buyers should use some kind of anonymous payment system, such as
Bitcoin [13], Zerocoin [12], some other form of electronic cash [6], or
simply scratch cards with prepaid credit anonymously bought, say, at
a newsstand. In physical stores, it would be enough to pay with cash.
– Consumers should not be able to leverage their anonymity to reveal
forged profiles to the vendor, which would earn them rewards without
actually revealing anything on their real purchase pattern.
Our proposed mechanism, thus, needs to take care of the two main
aspects of loyalty programs. First, it has to provide a way to obtain and
submit loyalty points in an anonymous and unlinkable way; that is, a
customer should be able to submit a particular loyalty point to a vendor,
but the vendor should not be able to link that particular loyalty point
to the transaction in which it was issued. Second, our mechanism must
allow customers to build their own generalized profiles from their purchase
history, but it must prevent customers to forge false profiles and vendors
to link the generalized profiles to particular customers. We will show later
that these two aspects can be tackled in a similar way.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a traditional
loyalty program and presents the requirements and security properties
our new protocol should satisfy. In Section 3 we introduce a crypto-
graphic protocol based on partially blind signatures that is the basis of
our proposed solution. Section 4 discusses a generalization strategy that
our protocol will follow. In Section 5 we present our privacy-preserving
loyalty program protocol. In Section 6 we analyze the performance of the
system in terms of computation and communication complexity. Finally,
Section 7 summarizes our conclusions and plans for future work.
2 Loyalty programs
Our method aims to offer all the functionalities of loyalty programs; that
is, to allow vendors to reward returning customers with loyalty points and
profile returning customers based on their purchase histories. The novelty
is that our scheme empowers customers with the ability to decide how
accurately they disclose their purchase histories to vendors.
A simple and perhaps the most widespread approach to implement
a loyalty program is to have a centralized server, owned and operated
by some vendor V, that stores the information on the program partic-
ipants. This information includes all the personal data the participants
gave to the vendor when they enrolled to the program, their balance of
loyalty points, and their history of purchases. Each customer is given a
loyalty card which contains the identifier of her record in the server’s
database. Each time a customer buys at a store and presents her loy-
alty card, her record in the server is updated, by adding to it the items
she bought and modifying her balance of loyalty points if needed. In this
way, all transactions by each customer can be linked to each other using
the customer’s identifier. Even if the customer provided false information
when she enrolled to the loyalty program, all of her transactions would be
linked anyway. Hence, discovering the customer’s identity in one individ-
ual transaction (e.g. through the credit or debit card used for payment)
would allow linking her entire profile to her real identity.
If control over profiling and purchase histories is to be left to cus-
tomers, a centralized approach does not seem a good solution. Moreover,
we should also ensure that individual transactions cannot be linked to
each other unless desired by the customer. To do so, we will let each cus-
tomer manage locally and anonymously her own balance of loyalty points
and history of purchases.
2.1 A privacy-preserving alternative
Our proposed mechanism follows the decentralized approach. To allow lo-
cal management of loyalty points and purchase receipts by the customer,
we treat points and receipts as anonymous electronic cash that is issued
by vendors and which can only be redeemed at the vendor who issued
it. Moreover, the concrete implementation of the loyalty program should
discourage customers from transferring loyalty points and purchase re-
ceipts among them. Purchase histories will be built by the vendor from
the individual purchase receipts of all products purchased by each cus-
tomer that the customer allows the vendor to link together; furthermore,
the customer can decide how generalized/coarsened are the product de-
scriptions in the purchase receipts she allows the vendor to link to one
another.
Our proposed loyalty program protocol suite consists of the following
procedures:
– Setup. Algorithm run by some designated entity, which, on input
a security parameter, outputs the parameters of the system. These
parameters can be common to several vendors.
– VendorSetup. Protocol run by a vendor V in which the specific
loyalty program is set up. Also, V obtains the public parameters of
the system and a key pair.
– Enroll. Protocol run by some customer C whereby C is given access
to the loyalty program and the means to participate in it, typically a
loyalty card or a smartphone application.
– Use. Interactive protocol run between some V and C, in which C inputs
the name of a product she wants to buy and obtains a purchase receipt
which proves that C has purchased the product from V.
– Submit. Interactive protocol run between some V and C, in which C
submits a list of possibly generalized purchase receipts to V, in order
to get loyalty points.
– Issue. Interactive protocol run between some V and C, in which C
obtains a certain amount of loyalty points.
– Redeem. Interactive protocol run between some V and C, in which
C submits a certain amount of loyalty points to V to obtain some
benefits.
2.2 Desirable properties
We can state the following requirements for loyalty points and purchase
receipts:
– Correctness. Loyalty points issued by a V to a C following the Issue
protocol are accepted by the same V running the Redeem protocol.
Similarly, purchase receipts given by V to some C during the Use
protocol will be accepted by the same V in the Submit protocol, even
if they have been generalized.
– Unforgeability. It should be impossible to any malicious customer
or any coalition of malicious customers and vendors to forge new loy-
alty points or receipts issued by a vendor V, regardless of how many
original loyalty points or receipts they own from V.
– Anonymity. Loyalty points and purchase receipts should be granted
in an anonymous way. A vendor should be unable to learn anything
about a customer redeeming points or submitting receipts, other than
the customer legitimately owns them. This should hold even if the
vendor colludes with other vendors or customers.
– Controlled linkability. A customer C should be able to decide whether
a submitted purchase receipt can be linked to other purchase receipts
submitted by C to the same vendor V.
3 Anonymous tokens with controlled linkability
As stated in the previous section, loyalty points and purchase receipts
have requirements in line with those of anonymous electronic cash and
anonymous electronic credentials. These well-known technologies use blind
signatures and/or zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge [3,4,6,14]. We will
treat points and receipts using a construction that we call anonymous
tokens. These tokens will be realized by using partially blind signatures
with some additional features.
3.1 Partially blind signatures
Blind signature protocols are interactive protocols between a requester
and a signer, in which the signer produces a digital signature of a mes-
sage submitted by the requester, but does not learn anything about the
message content. This primitive was introduced by Chaum in [5] and
has since been used in a vast array of privacy related protocols, such
as e-cash, electronic voting and anonymous credential systems. An in-
herent drawback of blind signature protocols is that the signer cannot
enforce a certain format on the message. Traditionally, this problem has
been solved using cut-and-choose techniques, in which the requester of a
signature generates and blinds a number n of messages, the signer asks
the requester to unblind all messages but a randomly chosen one, checks
whether all unblinded messages conform to the required format and, if
yes, signs the only message that remains blinded. Using cut-and-choose
techniques solves the problem (the probability that the requester suc-
ceeds in getting a non-conformant message signed is upper-bounded by
1/n), but it does so at the cost of high computation and communication
overheads.
Partially blind signatures were introduced by Abe in [1] as an alterna-
tive to cut-and-choose protocols. In a partially blind signature protocol,
the requester and the signer agree on a public information that is to be
included in the signed message, the signer can be sure that such infor-
mation is really included, and the requester can be sure that the signed
message remains blinded to the signer.
We use a partially blind signature scheme from bilinear pairings pre-
sented in [18]. This scheme satisfies the requirements of completeness,
partial blindness and unforgeability against one-more forgery under cho-
sen message attacks, and thus it is considered secure. Security proofs can
be found in the original paper. Additionally, this scheme produces short
signatures, it is computationally efficient and allows aggregate verification
of signed messages bearing the same agreed public information.
3.2 Controlled linkability of tokens
The use of partially blind signatures will ensure that a submitted token
cannot be linked to an issued token, nor to the customer to whom it was
issued. However, if vendors are to be allowed to build customer profiles
from anonymous purchase receipts, there must be a mechanism whereby,
if allowed by the customer, the vendor can verify that several submitted
purchase receipt tokens really correspond to the same (anonymous) cus-
tomer, even if receipts have been generalized by the customer prior to
submission. Note that if all (ungeneralized) purchase receipts from the
same customer could be linked, customer anonymity would be problem-
atic in spite of partially blind signatures: a very long and detailed profile
is likely to be unique and goes a long way towards leaking the customer’s
identity.
Thus, we propose a mechanism that allows customers to decide which
purchase receipt tokens can be linked together, by employing an addi-
tional identifier as part of the secret message in the partially blind signa-
ture. This identifier is chosen by the customer for each receipt token at
the moment of token issuance. If a customer picks a fresh random number
for each issued purchase receipt, then none of this customer’s receipts will
be linkable to each other; however, if the customer uses the same identi-
fier for a group of purchase receipt tokens at the time of token issuance,
then all of the tokens in this group can be verifiably linked together by
the vendor after they are submitted.
3.3 Description
Anonymous tokens are operated in four phases:
– In the setup phase, a certification agency generates the public param-
eters of the partially blind signature scheme.
– In the key generation phase, users (i.e. vendors and customers) get
their key pairs from the certification agency.
– In the issuance phase, a token corresponding to some loyalty points
or to a purchase receipt is generated by a customer, it is signed in a
partially blind way by a vendor and it is returned to the customer.
– Finally, in the verification phase, a customer submits previously gen-
erated tokens to a vendor, who in turn verifies that each token was
correctly signed. If tokens correspond to purchase receipts, the vendor
may verify whether the submitted tokens are linked with each other
and/or with previously submitted tokens.
Setup. This algorithm is executed once by a certification authority to set
up the system parameters. It takes as input a security parameter λ. The
algorithm chooses bilinear groups (G1,GT ) of order q > 2
λ, an efficiently
computable bilinear map e : G1 × G1 → GT , a generator g ∈ G1 and
collision-resistant hash functions H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q and H0 : {0, 1}
∗ → G1.
The public parameters are pms = {G1,GT , e, q, λ, g,H,H0}.
Key generation. A vendor gets a secret key skV = x ∈R Z
∗
q and a
public key pkV = g
x, and publishes his public key.
Token issuance. A customer wants to obtain from a vendor a token with
an agreed public information c (this information may specify a number
of loyalty points or a purchase receipt for a certain product). This is an
interactive protocol which produces a partially blind signature on public
information c, and a secret message containing a unique identifier α of
the token and a (possibly) unique identifier y. The protocol is depicted
in Figure 1 and described next:
1. The customer chooses a value for y, either from a list of previously
used values or by generating a new one uniformly at random from Z∗q.
2. The customer and the vendor agree on a public string c ∈ {0, 1}∗.
3. The customer chooses random α, r ∈R Z
∗
q and builds the message
m = (α, y). Then, the customer blinds the message by computing
u = H0(c||m)
r and sends u to the vendor.
4. The vendor signs the blinded message by computing v = u(H(c)+skV )
−1
and sends it back to the customer.
5. The customer unblinds the signature by computing σ = vr
−1
. The
resulting tuple T = 〈c,m, σ〉 is the token.
An execution of this protocol, between a vendor V and a customer C,
is denoted by T = 〈c,m, σ〉 = Issuance(V, C, c, y).
Token verification. The submission and verification of a token is an
interactive protocol between a customer and a vendor. The customer sub-
mits the token T = 〈c,m, σ〉 and the vendor returns accept or reject as
a result of the verification. Informally, the vendor checks that the signa-
ture on the token is valid and has been produced by himself; then, if the
value y contained in the message matches the one of a previously submit-
ted token, the tokens are grouped. The protocol is outlined in Figure 2
and described next:
1. The customer sends T = 〈c,m, σ〉 to the vendor.
2. The vendor parses the message m as (α, y).
Customer Vendor
y ∈ Z∗q skV
c∈{0,1}∗
←−−−−−−−−−−→
α, r ∈R Z
∗
q
m = (α, y)
u = H0(c||m)
r u−−−−−−−−−−−→
v
←−−−−−−−−−−− v = u(H(c)+skV )
−1
σ = vr
−1
T = 〈c,m,σ〉
Fig. 1. Token issuance protocol
3. The vendor verifies the signature by checking the equality
e(gH(c) · pkV , σ)
?
= e(g,H0(c||m)).
If the above equality holds, check whether the token has already been
spent (verify whether a token with the same α has previously been
submitted). If the verification was successful and the token has not
been spent yet, mark it as spent and send an accept message to the
customer. Otherwise, send a reject message to the customer.
4. Finally, the vendor checks whether the identifier value y is the same
as the one in a previously spent token. If yes, link the new token with
that previous one.
An execution of this protocol involving a customer C, a vendor V and
a token T is denoted as accept/reject = Verification(V, C, T ).
Customer Vendor
T pkV
T=〈c,m,σ〉
−−−−−−−−−−−→
Parse m as (α, y)
e(gH(c)pkV , σ)
?
= e(g,H0(c||m))
accept/reject
←−−−−−−−−−−− and token not spent yet.
Link token to previous ones with same y
Fig. 2. Verification protocol
Aggregate verification. This protocol allows the customer to aggregate
signatures of messages bearing the same public information by just mul-
tiplying the resulting signatures. If there is a list of tokens {T1, . . . , Tn},
where Ti = 〈ci,mi, σi〉, and ci = c for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, a customer can ag-
gregate the partially blind signatures by computing σagg =
∏n
i=1 σi and
submitting Tagg = 〈c, {m1, · · · ,mn}, σagg〉. The vendor can then verify
the validity of the aggregated token by checking the equality
e(gH(c) · pk, σagg)
?
= e(g,
∏
H0(c||mi)).
3.4 Security analysis
The desirable security features that were described in Section 2.2 are
satisfied by the above protocol suite, as argued below.
– Correctness. If the partially blind signature scheme is correctly com-
puted, the verification equation will pass, because
e(gH(c) · pk, σ) = e(gH(c)+x, σ)
= e(gH(c)+x, vr
−1
)
= e(gH(c)+x, u(H(c)+x)
−1·r−1)
= e(gH(c)+x,H0(c||m)
r·r−1·(H(c)+x)−1)
= e(g,H0(c||m)
r·r−1·(H(c)+x)·(H(c)+x)−1)
= e(g,H0(c||m)).
– Unforgeability. Unforgeability is provided by the partially blind sig-
nature scheme. The security proofs can be found in the original work
in [18].
– Anonymity. No information on the user is obtained by a server dur-
ing the protocol. Submitted tokens cannot be linked to issued tokens
or to the identity of a requester or prover because of the partial blind-
ness property of the signature scheme.
– Controlled linkability.When a token is issued, the identifying value
y is only known to the customer who generated the token, due to
the partial blindness of the signature. Hence, if two verified tokens
contain the same identifying value y, there are two possibilities: i)
both tokens were generated by the same customer, who re-used y
to allow the vendor to link them; ii) the customer who generated
one token leaked y to the customer who generated the other token.
If the latter leakage is prevented by technical means or discouraged
with appropriate incentives (see discussion in Section 5.8 below), then
two tokens containing the same y can be linked by the vendor as
corresponding to the same customer.
4 Generalization of purchase histories
To implement our protocol, a vendor must use a publicly available tax-
onomy for the products he offers. This taxonomy T is modeled as a tree,
being its root node a generic identifier such as Product, and each leaf
a specific product in the set of products P = {p1, . . . , pn} on sale. The
inner nodes of the tree are the subsequent categories to which the prod-
ucts belong: the closer to the leaf nodes, the more specific categories are.
A generalization function g : T → T returns the parent of a node. Ap-
plying the generalization function m times will be denoted as gm. As
an example, for the product pi = Inception, its generalizations might
be g(pi) = ActionMovie, g
2(pi) = Movie, g
3(pi) = DigitalMedia and
g4(pi) = Product. For simplicity and ease of implementation, it is desir-
able that all leaves be at the same depth, that is, that the path from the
root to any leaf be of the same length.
Customers in our loyalty program protocol will receive a list of anony-
mous tokens, each issued as described in the previous section, for every
product they purchase. This list contains a receipt for the specific product
and receipts for all of its generalizations in the path up to the root of the
taxonomy (generalization path). When a customer decides to submit her
purchase history, she chooses the level of generalization she wants for each
purchase. Then the customer sends for each purchase the tokens in the
purchase generalization path from the chosen generalization level up to
the root of the taxonomy. Following the movie example above, a customer
who wants to submit her purchase generalized to level 2 will submit the
tokens Movie, DigitalMedia and Product. Forcing customers to send all
tokens from the selected generalization level to the root prevents them
from using tokens in the generalization path of a purchase to falsely claim
other purchases.
5 Privacy-preserving loyalty program construction
Our proposed solution for privacy-preserving loyalty programs builds on
the anonymous tokens we described in Section 3 and the generalization of
purchase histories described in Section 4. As introduced in Section 2, our
construction consists of the following protocols: Setup, VendorSetup,
Enroll, Use, Submit, Issue and Redeem.
5.1 Setup
The setup phase is run by a certification authority to generate the public
parameters pms of the anonymous token construction described in Sec-
tion 3. The system parameters are made public to every V offering loyalty
programs and to every C intending to participate in them.
5.2 VendorSetup
Each vendor V publishes a product taxonomy TV as described in Sec-
tion 4. Then, V obtains a key pair built as described in the key generation
procedure in Section 3. Finally, V publishes his public key.
5.3 Enroll
Customers obtain the public parameters of the system and some means
to communicate with the system, namely a smartcard or a smartphone
application. Furthermore, customers enrolling to a loyalty program from
a particular vendor obtain the vendor’s public key and his taxonomy of
products. This step is not mandatory, but it allows customers to check
that tokens issued by vendors are valid and purchase receipt generaliza-
tions are correct.
5.4 Use
A customer C in a loyalty program offered by a vendor V purchases a
product, either at a physical or online store of V. Note that, in the case of
an online store, C should use additional anonymization measures, such as
anonymous Internet surfing, offered for example by Tor networks [16],
anonymous shipping methods [10], and anonymous payment methods
(e.g. [13,6,12] or simply prepaid scratch cards). The protocol is as fol-
lows:
1. C sends to V the name pi of the product C wants to buy.
2. C chooses a value y to be used in the token issuance protocol, depend-
ing on her privacy preferences: if she wants the new purchase receipt
to be linkable to previously obtained purchase receipts (linkability is
incentivized as described in Section 5.8 below), she will re-use the
same y that was used in those previous receipts; if she does not want
this new purchase receipts to be linkable to previous receipts, she will
pick a new random y ∈ Z∗q.
3. In order to produce purchase receipt tokens for product pi and all its
generalizations, V and C run the interactive protocol Issuance(V,P, pi, y),
Issuance(V,P, g(pi), y), Issuance(V,P, g
2(pi), y), etc. up to the root of
the taxonomy. In this way, C obtains as many purchase receipt tokens
as the depth of pi in V’s taxonomy.
5.5 Submit
At any moment, a customer can submit a list of purchase receipts (or
a generalized version of them) to the vendor and obtain loyalty points.
To this end, for each purchased product in her claimed purchase history,
the customer sends the receipt token corresponding the level of general-
ization she wishes. Additionally, for each product, she also submits all
tokens from the selected generalization level up to the root of the tax-
onomy (to make sure tokens in the generalization path cannot be later
used as independent purchase receipts). The submission of each token Ti
is performed according to the Verification(V,P, Ti) protocol described in
Section 3.3.
5.6 Issue
To issue loyalty points, the vendor builds a message info that encodes an
identifier of the vendor, the number of points this token is worth and an
expiration date. Unlike for purchase receipts, the vendor has no legitimate
interest in linking several tokens containing loyalty points; hence, the
customer picks a fresh random y for each new loyalty points token she
claims. Then the vendor and the customer run the interactive protocol
Issuance(V,P, info, y). The generated token contains the loyalty points
issued to the customer.
To ensure that a loyalty points token submitted for redemption cannot
be linked with an issued loyalty points token, the number of loyalty points
associated to a single token should be limited to a small set of possible
values, similar to the limited denominations of bank notes. There is an
efficiency toll to be paid for this caution, as issuing a certain amount
of loyalty points can require running the Issuance protocol several times
(several tokens may be needed to reach the required amount).
5.7 Redeem
A participant C who wants to redeem a loyalty points token T previously
earned at a vendor V’s in exchange for some benefits runs the interactive
protocol Verification(V,P, T ).
It is possible to simultaneously redeem several loyalty points tokens
by using the aggregation of signatures described in Section 3.3.
5.8 Incentives related to purchase receipts submission
Vendors can establish strategies to incentivize or discourage certain cus-
tomer behaviors:
– To encourage customers to use little or no purchase receipt general-
ization (and hence to renounce some of their privacy), the amount of
loyalty points awarded per receipt token should depend on the chosen
level of generalization: more loyalty points awarded to less generalized
purchase receipts.
– If the customer submits unlinkable receipts, she should just get enough
loyalty points to reward her as a returning customer. To encourage
customers to allow linkage of purchase receipt tokens by the vendor
(and hence customer profiling), a customer should get more loyalty
points if she submits n1 + n2 tokens with the same y value than if
she submits n1 tokens with one y value and then n2 tokens with a
different y value (superlinear reward). Furthermore, the vendor may
require that the list of linkable receipt tokens for which reward is
claimed correspond to purchases made within a certain time window
(if linking purchases very distant in time is uninteresting for profiling).
– Two or more customers might be tempted to share their y values in
order to submit a longer list of linkable receipts and thereafter share
the superlinear number of loyalty points they would earn. As long the
reward is only slightly superlinear, customer collusion is discouraged
if the customer C who submits the list of linkable tokens is required
by V to actually show all the actual linkable tokens (and not just a
reference to them): colluders different from C may not like to pay the
privacy toll of disclosing their purchase receipts to C.
6 Performance analysis
We count here the number of operations required by the Issuance and
Verification protocols described in Section 3.
The Issuance protocol requires the computation by the vendor of 1
exponentiation in G1; also, 1 hash, 1 addition and 1 inversion in Z
∗
q.
The customer computes 2 exponentiations in G1 and 1 inversion in Z
∗
q.
The Verification protocol requires the computation by the vendor of 1
exponentiation, 1 multiplication and 1 hash in G1; also, 1 hash in Z
∗
q and
2 pairings.
We used the jPBC library [8] to test times to compute each of the
operations. We generated a symmetric pairing constructed on the curve
y2 = x3 + x with characteristic a 512-bit prime and embedding degree 2,
i.e., the Type A pairings suggested in [11]. The order of G1 over the curve
is a prime of 160 bits, elements in G1 are 512 bits long and elements in
Z
∗
q 160 bits long.
With the above technology choices, a multiplication of points in G1
takes 0.09 ms, an exponentiation in G1 takes 17.2 ms, an exponentiation
in G1 (with precomputation) takes 2.48 ms, a pairing takes 20.8 ms, and
a pairing (with precomputation) takes 10.76 ms.
7 Conclusions and future work
In our privacy-preserving alternative to traditional loyalty programs, the
customers are granted the power to decide what private information they
want to disclose, and how precise that information is. We have described
a privacy-preserving protocol suite that still offers the two main features
of loyalty programs: reward returning customers and make customer pro-
filing possible.
Future research will involve hiding the y values to technically deter
customer collusions in purchase receipt submission. Also, in the context
of a Google Faculty Research Award that partially funds this work, we
plan to implement our solution using smartphones on the customer’s side
and test a demonstrator to show its practical feasibility.
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